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VALUING THE OPTION TO SWITCH TO ORGANIC FARMING: AN 




Based on option value theory, we develop a theoretical model to assess the dollar compensation 
required for the conversion to organic farming. Our empirical model is a switching regression model 
with  two  regimes  and  we  use  county  level  data  on  organic  and  conventional  corn  and  soybean 
production in the U.S. for the application. Assuming an interest rate of 10 percent, a conventional 
corn soybean grower would need to receive a one time payment of $315 per acre to compensate for 
the conversion cost and an additional $1,088 per acre to cover the long run higher production and 
market risks. The sum of these two values equals an annual payment of $228 per acre for a 10 year 
contact. The results are discussed in the context of the recently introduced Conservation Security 
Program, which will make direct payments to US farmers for organic practices.    
 
Keywords:  option  theory,  organic  farming,  direct  payments,  switching  regression,  Conservation 
Security Program  
 
JEL classification: D81, Q18.  
 
1.  Introduction  
 
Organic farming is one of the fastest growing segments of U.S. agriculture. Certified organic 
farmland  for  corn,  soybeans  and  livestock  doubled  between  1992  and  1997,  and  doubled  again 
between 1997 and 2001. In total, there were 2.3 million acres of cropland and pasture dedicated to 
organic production in 2001 (Greene and Kremen, 2003). Irrespective of the high growth rates, organic 
production remains a very small fraction of U.S. agriculture, 0.3 percent of all farmland is certified 
organic and organic food sales represent 1.3 percent of total food expenditures (MacInnis, 2004). 
The realisation that agriculture has a major impact on the environment has led to a change in 
policy to make organic production more attractive to farmers. The 2002 U.S. Farm Bill introduced 
policies that could substantially increase government support for organic agriculture. Notably, the 
federal Conservation Security Program (CSP) will make direct payments to farmers for preexisting 
and ongoing conservation work. This is the first time that a farm bill has contained provision for 
“green” payments. Under the CSP, many growing practices that are standard on organic farms will 
qualify for payments. In contrast, existing federal programs only share the cost of installing new 
conservation projects. With the announcement of the CSP it becomes relevant to ask the question: 
what level of direct payments will induce a conversion to organic farming? 
At present, there exists little theoretical work or empirical evidence on the dollar compensation 
that would be needed to induce U.S. farmers to voluntarily adopt organic practices. The literature has 
focused on the use of discrete choice methods to analyze farmers’ decisions whether or not to adopt 
organic farming. While these methods yield probabilities of adoption, the resulting estimates cannot 
be readily converted into dollar compensation levels (Klonsky and Smith, 2002; Kurkalova et al., 
2003). For a discrete choice model to provide this information, direct subsidies have to be included as 
an independent variable (e.g., Fairweather and Campbell, 1996; Lohr and Salomonson, 2000; Pietola 
and Oude Lansink, 2001). However, this is not an option in the context of the CSP, because direct 
payments are yet to be introduced. Thus, we take a different modelling approach. 
Our theoretical model starts from the observation that many non organic farmers perceive organic 
farming  as  more  risky  than  conventional  farming  (Padel  and  Lampkin,  1994).  Previous  survey 
research has shown that farmers perceive the uncertainty of the conversion to organic as a major 
obstacle (Padel, 2001). Legally, a farm in transition from conventional to organic must keep rigorous 
records for three years before being fully certified. The physical transition cost may be incurred for 
several more years, including penalties in yield or costs due to agro ecosystems adjustments and 
management inefficiencies while new practices are learnt. Key financial constraints are the lack of   2 
access  to  premium  prices  until  conversion  is  complete,  conversion related  investments  and 
disinvestments, and information gathering costs for production and marketing (Lohr, 2001). In the 
presence of these transition costs and uncertainty about the future development of earnings, a risk 
neutral farmer is not indifferent between organic and conventional if current returns per acre are 
similar for both practices. 
Our theoretical model of a farmer’s decision to convert to organic farming under uncertainty is 
based on option value theory (MacDonald and Siegel, 1986; Pfann, 2001; Wossink and Gardebroek, 
2005).  The  difference  between  the  option  value  approach  and  the  traditional  net  present  value 
approach is that a farmer switches to organic farming when the net present value of the difference in 
expected future cash flows from conventional and organic farming exceeds the costs of transition plus 
an option value. The option value is the discounted value of the dollar compensation required because 
of the additional uncertainty. The theoretical model depicts two effects of a change in policy in favour 
of organic practices. The direct effect of such policies is to decrease the option value. In addition, the 
possibility  of  future  changes  to  the  policy  may  indirectly  increase  or  decrease  the  option  value, 
depending on farmers’ expectations.    
Based on the option approach, and following Spiller and Huang (1986), our empirical model for 
conversion from conventional to organic farming is a switching regression model with two regimes. 
We implement the empirical model for corn and soybeans using a data set summarizing organic 
agriculture from the Organic Farming Research Foundation (OFRF). OFRF periodically conducts a 
national survey of organic farmers, yielding the most complete set of information available on organic 
farming in the United States.  
We proceed as follows. The next section presents the theoretical model, followed by a discussion 
of the Conservation Security Program, the empirical model and a description of the data. We conclude 
with results, conclusions and policy implications.  
 
 
2.  Theoretical model 
 
2.1 The option value approach  
 
An important pre condition for widespread adoption of organic farming, or any new technology, 
is its profitability for farmers. Also in organic agriculture a truism is that the later adopters are more 
often motivated by profitability (Lohr, 2000, p. 136). Thus, our theoretical model assumes profit 
maximization. 
At present time t = 0 a representative, risk neutral farmer values the expected lifetime returns 
from  conventional  farming  as  C0.  In  the  meantime  he  scans  the  expected  returns  from  organic 
farming. Let O0 denote the present value of the expected lifetime earnings of organic farming for the 
representative farmer at time t = 0. To obtain O0 the farmer must incur fixed costs that become sunk 
upon  transition.  These  sunk  costs  include  the  record  keeping,  physical  transition,  management, 
financial  and  information  costs  discussed  above.  In  the  presence  of  fixed  transition  costs  and 
uncertainty about the future development of the expected stream of earnings differences the farmer is 
not indifferent if C0 = O0. 
Let Rt denote the differential between the discounted expected cash flows for a farmer who gives 
up conventional farming for organic farming at time t, and let T denote the fixed transition costs for 
the representative farmer. Under a conventional NPV calculation, the farmer will make the switch if Rt 
–T ≥ 0. The value of Rt, however, becomes increasingly uncertain the further t lies in the future 
because of production and market uncertainty. Thus, R is assumed to follow a geometric Brownian 
motion with drift: 
 
        Rdz Rdt dR σ   + =                                                                       (1) 
   3 
 where   is the expected growth rate of the stream of value differences between the discounted expected 
cash flows; σ  is the standard deviation; and dz is the random increment of a standard Wiener process 
such that  0 = dz Ε ,  dt dz = 2 Ε .  
The geometric Brownian motion implies that the present value of switching from conventional to 
organic farming may be different if the transition is postponed. Equation (1) implies that future values of 
the  investment  are  log normally  distributed  with  expected  value  [ ] ) exp( 0 0 t R Rt   Ε = ,  where  0 Ε  
denotes  the  expectation  at  time  0.  Assuming  that  the  investment  is  infinitely  lived,  the  expected 
value, [ ] R F , of the differential R is (Macdonald and Siegel, 1986):   
 
                  [ ] ( )  

 
 − − = 0 max   Ε rt e T t R R F                                   (2) 
   
subject to equation (1), where t is the time of  investment, r is the discount rate and  0   is the information 
available to the farmer at t = 0. 
     The total return for investing at the beginning of the period is rF. The value of postponing the 
investment decision is equal to the expected increase in F during this period. The first order condition for 
this problem is  t dF rFdt   Ε = . Using Ito’s lemma to obtain the total differential for  dF , the first 
order condition can be rewritten as  0 ) ( ) (
2 2
2
1 = − ′ + ′ ′ rF R F R R F R   σ . The analytical solution is 
widely available in the literature (e.g. MacDonald and Siegel, 1986) and yields:   
 
        T R α = *   where   ( ) 1 − = β β α                                                     (3) 
 




1 / 2 / / σ σ   σ   β r + − + − = . Since  1 > β ,  1 > α  and hence  T R >
* 1. Thus, in the 
presence  of  irreversibility  and  uncertainty  the  NPV  principle  that  equates  R  with  T  is  no  longer 
applicable. Uncertainty brings about a positive wedge between the trigger value R* and the traditional 
NPV hurdle R. This wedge with size  ( )T 1 − α  is the value of the option to postpone the decision to 
convert to organic farming because of the production and market risk reflected in σ. The wedge can be 
substantial even for small levels of uncertainty about future returns.    
 
 
2.2 Sensitivity of the conversion trigger value to changes in agricultural policy  
 
Since 2001, there have been three major policy changes that differently affect organic farmers. The 
US Department of Agriculture (USDA) has made organic farmers eligible for partially subsidised crop 
insurance, it has introduced conversion subsidies, and it has introduced a system of direct payments for 
existing conservation practices (many of which are standard for organic growers).  Each of these changes 
should reduce the trigger value, R*, at which the conventional farmer chooses to switch to organic. 
Conversion  subsidies  directly  decrease  the  cost  of  conversion;  in  equation  (3)  a  decrease  in  T 
decreases R*. Similarly, the net present value of a series of direct payments can be subtracted from the 
transition costs, also decreasing R*. The availability of crop insurance decreases R* by reducing the 
uncertainty, associated with the difference in the stream of returns from organic and conventional 
farming.  
While the direct effects of introducing conversion subsidies, payments and crop insurance is to 
reduce the value of postponing the conversion decision, these policies also introduce a new dimension of 
uncertainty if farmers are unsure about the life of the programs and other future policy changes. This 
policy uncertainty may, in turn, affect option values. While there are many possible sources of policy 
uncertainty − see Gardner (2001) for a useful overview − we will focus on a single fairly general case. 
                                                 
1 If r ≤  , the value of the investment opportunity will be infinity and the farmer will never exercise the option to 
convert .    4 
Suppose that farmers believe that at some unknown future date the difference in returns from organic and 
conventional farming may take a discrete jump upward or downward because of an additional policy 
change affecting organic farming. Then equation (1) can be rewritten as a mixed Wiener Poisson process:  
 
                          Rdq Rdz Rdt dR + + = σ                                                             (4) 
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Equation (4) implies that at each point in time there is positive probability λ that returns will change 
by θ percent, with the direction of the change depending on the sign of θ. In this case, the expected 
trend reflects the policy uncertainty:  Ε(dR)/R =  +λ θ. In the presence of this policy uncertainty, the 
first order condition for the value of the investment opportunity, t dF rFdt   Ε = , can be written as 
( ) ( ) [ ] 0 1 ) ( ) ( ) (
2 2
2
1 = + + + − ′ + ′ ′ R F R F r R F R R F R θ λ λ   σ .  The  solution  is  again  of  the  form 
T R ) ( ) ( * λ α λ =  with  ( ) ( ) 1 ) ( ) ( ) ( − = λ β λ β λ α   where  ) , , , , ( ) ( r f σ   θ λ λ β =  is implicitly defined 
by the equation:  [ ] ( ) 0 ) 1 ( ) ( 1 ) ( ) ( ) ( 2
2
1 = + + + − + − λ β θ λ λ λ  β λ β λ β σ r .  
The effect of policy uncertainty on the conversion trigger value depends on whether the policy 
change is expected to increase or decrease the relative returns to organic farming. First, consider the 
case where the policy change increases the relative returns to organic. For example, farmers might 
believe there is a positive probability that the size of the conversion subsidies will increase in the 
future (θ>0). A positive value of θ has two effects on R*; it increases the expected growth rate of R 
which increases F(R) and it increases the variance of R which also increases F(R). It follows that 
β(λ)< β, α(λ) > α  and thus R*(λ) > R*. A positive probability of a change in agricultural policy that 
increases  the  relative  returns  of  organic  farming  increases  the  value  of  postponing  the  conversion 
decision, and this increases the critical value.  
Now suppose farmers anticipate a policy change that would decrease the relative returns to organic 
farming. For example, farmers might suspect that USDA may terminate its conversion subsidies at some 
point in the future (θ<0). A negative value of θ decreases the expected growth rate of R and increases 
its variance. The net effect is to reduce F(R) (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; p. 167 173). In this case β(λ) 
>β, α(λ) < α  and thus R*(λ) < R*. The possibility that current policies (which are favourable to organic 
farming) will be terminated in the future decreases the incentive for a farmer to postpone the conversion 





Four comments about the theoretical model are appropriate. First, it is important to emphasize that the 
results depend only on the properties of dz and that the Wiener process (or Brownian motion) can be 
generalized to a broad class of continuous time stochastic processes (Merton, 1990). The geometric 
Brownian motion serves as a convenient example because it has an analytical solution. Alternatively, we 
could obtain similar results by assuming that R follows a mean reverting process (Odening et al., 2005). 
Second, as demonstrated by MacDonald and Siegel, incorporating risk aversion considerations in 
the model does not affect the solutions for R* and R*(λ). This follows from the implicit assumption in 
the option approach of an exponential utility function in combination with the Brownian motion 
Poisson jump process.  
Third, following the theoretical model, farmers’ decision to switch to organic farming will not be 
completely due to differences in returns and transition costs. We expect farmers to react to production 
and market uncertainty and thus to find proof of option values that reflect the value of waiting to 
switch.    5 
 Fourth,  he  interest  in  the  application  to  the  transition  to  organic  farming  lies  with  the 
multiplication factors α and α(λ) that distinguish the NPV trigger, R, from its real option counterparts 
R* and R*(λ). In addition, a comparison of R* and R*(λ) enables an assessment of the development in 
the option value over time. We expect that a change in agricultural policy in favour of organic farming 
leads to a distinct decrease in the option value, although it may also increase policy uncertainty. 
 
 
3.  Application  
 
3.1 The 2002 Farm Bill and Conservation Security Program 
 
The Conservation Security Program is part of a dramatic change in U.S. farm policy toward organic 
growers. Traditionally, intervention by the USDA to stimulate organic agriculture focused primarily 
on market facilitation, such as establishing federal standards and labels (Lohr, 2001). Prior to 2001, 
organic growers were eligible for less financial support than their conventional counterparts. While 
organic growers received compensation from standard commodity support programs, federal crop 
insurance policies would generally not compensate them for losses because organic farming prevented 
the use of some of the (chemical) techniques expected under the official definition of “good farming 
practices”. This changed under the 2000 Agricultural Risk Protection Act and crop insurance for 
many organic crops became available by May 2001. The 2002 Farm Bill introduced two additional 
major policy changes. It funded “agricultural management assistance” which can be used in selected 
states to pay for 75% of the cost of conversion to organic agriculture, up to $50,000 per producer. It 
also created the Conservation Security Program, which will provide direct payments for ongoing 
environmental stewardship on agricultural land.    
The duration and amount of CSP payments depend on the extent of conservation work performed 
on the farm and the acres enrolled. To apply for the program, farmers must submit detailed records on 
farming practices for at least the previous two years. A qualified farm will be placed into one of three 
tiers according to the extent of conservation activity on the farm. Tier I farmers must have addressed 
soil and water quality to satisfy the Field Office Technical Guide (FOTG) standards on part of the 
farm prior to enrolment. Tier II farmers must have addressed soil and water quality on the entire farm, 
and  agree to address  one additional  resource  concern  by  the  end  of the contract  period. Tier  III 
farmers  must  have  satisfied  FOTG  standards  on  all  resource  issues  for  the  entire  farm,  prior  to 
enrolment (US Department of Agriculture, 2004a, b).  
Within each tier, the actual payment is equal to the number of acres enrolled multiplied by a base 
payment rate, plus “enhancement payments” for exceptional conservation effort beyond the required 
levels. Depending on the tier, the base payment is 5 15 percent of the average national per acre rental 
rate for a specific use or an appropriate adjusted regional rental rate. The second portion of the CSP 
payment is the average county cost of adopting or maintaining practices for the crop year.  
The total annual payment per farm and the length of payments are capped in each tier according to 
the following scheme: (Tier I) up to $20,000 for five years, (Tier II) up to $35,000 for 5 to 10 years, 
and (Tier III) up to $45,000 for 5 to 10 years. Contracts for Tier II and II can be renewed; for Tier I 
renewal  requires  broadening  the  scope  of  practices.  Because  of  funding  limits,  the  program  is 
operated  on  the  basis  of  individual  watersheds,  and  rotated  around  the  country  with  signups  for 
different areas each year (US Department of Agriculture, 2004c). CSP program officials speculate that 
within 8 years, every farmer in the U.S. will have had an opportunity to enrol. 
The most obvious benefit of the CSP for organic farmers is the reduction of individual farm 
income risk. By virtue of their certification, organic farmers automatically satisfy a subset of the 
relevant  FOTG  standards.  This  suggests  the  average  organic  farm  is  closer  to  enrolment  in  the 
program than the average conventional farm and certified and in transition organic farmers are likely 
to qualify for Tier 3 payments (Lohr, 2001). Payment will be specifically tied to actual farming 
practices and their relative impact on environmental quality and resource protection. The farmer will 
receive 15 percent of the base payment plus 75 percent (90 percent for beginning farmers) of the 
average practice cost. Though the maximum payment is $45,000 per farmer per year, Tier 3 total base 
payment may not exceed 30 percent of the tier limit, or $13,000.    6 
3.2 Empirical model  
 
Recall that R is the differential between the discounted expected cash flows of conventional farming 
and organic farming and so: R = (O C)/r. This differential is attributed to unobservable transition costs 
and an option value. From the theoretical model follows for the individual observation i:  
 
                                     i
a
i T e R =          if option value            (5) 
                                     i i T R =           if no option value            (6) 
 
with  0 > a . Following Spiller and Huang (1986) we specify transition cost Ti as a random variable with 
constant mean, T, that is  
 
                                    i
i Te T ν =                                                                                                (7) 
 
where  i ν  is normally distributed with zero mean and constant variance 
2
ν σ . Substituting (7) into (5) and 
(6) and taking natural logs gives: 
 
         i i T a R ν + + = ln ln       if option value           (8)
         
         i i T R ν + = ln ln        if no option value                                  (9) 
      ` 
where  0 > a . Equation (8) and (9) may be expressed as a switching regression system with a probability 
l  of observing an option value and a probability  l − 1  of observing no option value. When returns 
follow a random walk as assumed in the analysis, the rational expectations forecast for the returns is 




it it T a
r
C O






ln ln , with probability l,                   (10)            
 











ln ln , with probability 1 l,                          (11)           
 
where it O is the observed net earnings in organic farming for observation i at time t;  it C  is observed 
net earnings in conventional farming for observation i at time t; rt is the interest rate at time t; νit is a 
normally distributed i.i.d. variable; and a and T are parameters to be estimated. If equation (11) 
prevails,  production  and  market  risks  are  of  no  significance  to  organic  growers.  In  the  case  of 
equation (10), there is a positive option value. Using the estimates of T and a, option values can be 
calculated as T e
a ) 1 ( − .  
Equations (10) and (11) estimate a constant option value attributed to production and market 
uncertainty for the entire estimation period. To allow for year specific changes in the option value we 
replace (5) by  i
i D a
i T e R
γ + = , where  1 = i D  if the observation relates to the specific year, and 
replace (10) with: 
 
            it it
t
it it T D a
r
C O






ln ln .            (12) 
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To estimate the probability l of the switching regime model, parameters were chosen in order to 
maximize the log of the likelihood function:  
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where N is the total number of observations and fi
1and fi
2 denote the density functions of  
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= ;  and  φ  is  the  density 
function of the standard normal variable.  
The  switching  regime  model  was  first  estimated  without  a  time  dummy.  A  second  model 
specification includes a time dummy to distinguish the year 2001. The estimate for γ  allows testing 
for  the  extent to  which  the  option  value  in  2001  differs from  that  in  previous  years;  due to  the 
introduction of organic crop insurance (in May 2001), for example.  
 
 
3.3 Data  
 
We  employed  data  on individual  organic farms  from  the  OFRF  (see  http://www.ofrf.org),  which 
collects the data through a periodic national survey. OFRF provided us with survey results for two 
years, 1997 and 2001. Over 80 organically produced crops are included in the data. We implement the 
empirical model for corn and soybeans. In 2001, these two crops accounted for about 10 % of all 
certified organic cropland in the U.S., or 21.5 % if hay & silage are excluded (Greene and Kremen, 
2003).  
Each  individual  farm year  observation  consists  of  a  set  of  economic  variables  and  a  spatial 
identifier. The economic variables include acreage, production, price, and yield. Similar economic 
information for conventional production on the same farm set is not available. The spatial identifier 
includes the state and zip code of each farm. The economic variables along with the spatial identifier 
allow us to assess county level prices and yields of organic varieties of each crop. As a proxy for 
conventional returns, we use county level data on price and yield reported by the USDA National 
Agricultural Statistics Service. In addition, we assume that there is no difference between production 
costs for conventional and organic corn and soybeans at the county level. We are well aware of the 
work by Delate and others (e.g., Delate et al., 2003; Delate and Cambardella, 2004) who find that the 
higher seed, fieldwork and production costs are outweighed by the greater pesticide and fertilizer 
costs  incurred  for  conventional  varieties.  We  prefer  a  conservative  stance  and  assume  equal 
production costs for conventional and organic corn and soybeans.  
For soybeans, we have 247 farm level observations that stretch across 142 counties in 16 states.  
For corn we have 100 observations from 72 different counties across 14 states. Prices and returns are 
reported in 2001 dollars. Table 1 illustrates that price premiums for organic corn and soybeans more 
than compensate for lower average yields. Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the data as used 
in the empirical work. After omitting the counties with only one observation for organic production, 
we were left with observations for 45 counties.  
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Table 1. All observations  
Organic Conventional Organic conventional Organic conventional
96.4 126.6 4.6 2.6 439.2 331.0 63.0
(27.4) (17.2) (0.8) (0.2) (138.0) (46.5) (47.3)
91.4 137.1 3.6 2.0 332.4 268.6 59.0
(32.2) (18.9) (0.5) (0.1) (120.5) (35.0) (58.8)
30.7 41.5 17.6 7.1 538.1 293.0 89.0
(9.9) (5.7) (3.7) (0.2) (221.0) (40.7) (111.6)
27.4 38.7 12.3 5.3 339.7 203.7 76.0





















Table 2. Summary statistics as used in the estimation, county level averages  
Organic Conventional Organic conventional Organic conventional
87.4 115.0 4.6 2.5 402.1 287.8
(11.9) (13.9) (0.0) (0.1) (56.5) (42.8)
104.9 143.9 3.5 1.9 363.1 277.4
(11.9) (13.0) (0.3) (0.0) (63.7) (26.5)
31.7 41.0 18.1 7.1 572.5 289.2
(9.0) (5.1) (2.3) (0.1) (187.8) (36.9)
29.4 38.8 12.9 5.3 379.9 204.2
(6.4) (4.7) (1.8) (0.00) (96.3) (24.7)
14
23













Yield (bu/acre) Price ($/bu)
 
       
4.   Results 
 
We present results from the switching regime model for the combined corn soybean data and for 
each crop individually. Tables 3a/b and 4a/b summarize the results from using these data to estimate 
the likelihood functions shown in equations 14 and 15. The econometric model cannot separately 
identify the interest rate and the per/acre transition cost (T), as can be seen from equations 10 and 11.  
Therefore, we estimate the model for interest rates ranging from 0.05 to 0.15.
2  The tables also show 
the per acre option value implied by the parameter estimates.     
The  estimate  for the  probability  l   provides  evidence  of  option  values (Table 3a). The  95% 
confidence interval forl  is 0.90 ± 0.06 and does not include 0, which provides evidence that the 
regime with an option value was dominant. The estimate for the conversion costs, T, ranges from 
$211.09 to $631.49 per acre for the pooled data. Depending on the assumed interest rate (0.05 0.15),  
 
                                                 
2 The annual average return on 6 month T bills between 1997 and 2001 was approximately 5%, and the 75
th quartile of 
returns on farm assets was 6.5% (Hopkins and Morehart, 2000). However, the relevant interest rate must also incorporate the 
non diversifiable risk associated with organic farming. We expect this risk is substantial, given that price premiums in 
organic markets may depend on supply and demand factors that are largely uncorrelated with conventional markets.  This is 
also an explanation for why organic farmers were ineligible to purchase government crop insurance before 2001. We use an 
interest rate of 10% as our baseline.    9 
Table 3a: Parameter estimates Option Value Model for pooled corn and soybeans data 
r = 0.05 r = 0.075 r = 0.1 r = 0.125 r = 0.15
1.87*** 1.86*** 1.87*** 1.87*** 1.87***
(0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33)
631.49** 423.29** 316.34** 253.05** 211.09**
(220.75) (147.85) (110.55) (88.43) (73.76)
0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
0.54*** 0.54*** 0.54*** 0.54*** 0.54***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)





Mean Conversion Cost Per Acre
LLF Probability




*Standard errors are in brackets.  ***,**: Significant at 2.5%, 5% (two sided).  
 
 
Table 3b. Parameter estimates Option Value Model for soybeans data 
 
r = 0.05 r = 0.075 r = 0.1 r = 0.125 r = 0.15
1.77*** 1.77*** 1.87*** 1.87*** 1.87***
(0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28)
801.38** 534.32** 400.60** 320.60** 267.18**
(219.25) (146.18) (109.59) (87.73) (73.11)
0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.91
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
0.42*** 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.42***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Implied Option Value ($/acre) 3,882 2,588 1,941 1,553 1,294
l





Mean Conversion Cost Per Acre
LLF Probability






the significant estimate for the option value ranges from $1,154 to $3,642 per acre. The implied 
option value follows from the calculation of (e
a 1)T.  
Estimation for the two crops separately permits an assessment of differences in the crop specific 
option values; it may be that the risks associated with one crop particularly caused the average option 
value. Estimation of the model separately for soybeans yields similar estimates for the risk premium 
but higher estimates for the conversion costs (Table 3b). Both estimates are again significant. For corn 
there were insufficient observations to estimate the model separately. 
The results in Tables 3a and 3b are subject to a restrictive model assumption regarding the option 
value even when estimated by crop; it is implicitly assumed that the option value is constant over the 
time period covered by the data. In view of the US Conservation Security Program, we have special 
interest in the option value in the most recent year. In addition, in May 2001 crop insurance was 
introduced for many organic crops which might have affected the option value. We find a significant 
reduction in the option value for the pooled soybeans corn data of 53 percent (Table 4a). For soybeans 
alone the reduction in the option value was 30 percent (Table 4b). For 2001, the option value is 
calculated as (e
(a+γ)−1)T. The option value for 1997 follows from the calculation of (e
a 1)T, as before.  
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Table 4a.  Option Value Model with Year Dummy for pooled corn and soybeans data  
r = 0.05 r = 0.075 r = 0.1 r = 0.125 r = 0.15
2.04*** 2.02*** 2.03*** 2.00*** 2.00***
(0.46) (0.46) (0.46) (0.46) (0.46)
616.74** 419.52** 314.51** 257.63** 214.49**
(286.60) (195.10) (146.29) (120.01) (99.91)
0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
0.54*** 0.54*** 0.54*** 0.54*** 0.54***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
 0.53***  0.53***  0.53***  0.53***  0.53***
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
Implied Option Value: 1997 ($/acre) 4,146 2,758 2,069 1,651 1,376
Implied Option Value: 2001 ($/acre) 2,184 1,450 1,088 866 722
l
*Standard errors are in brackets.  ***,**: Significant at 2.5%, 5% (two sided).
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Table 4b.  Option Value Model with Year Dummy for soybeans data   
r = 0.05 r = 0.075 r = 0.1 r = 0.125 r = 0.15
1.74*** 1.72*** 1.72*** 1.72*** 1.72***
(0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25)
909.73** 615.21** 461.73** 369.52** 308.04**
(232.79) (158.82) (119.24) (95.46) (79.60)
0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
0.40*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.40***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
 0.30**  0.30**  0.30**  0.30**  0.30**
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Implied Option Value: 1997 ($/acre) 4,256 2,832 2,124 1,699 1,416





Mean Conversion Cost Per Acre
LLF Probability




*Standard errors are in brackets.  ***,**: Significant at 2.5%, 5% (two sided).




Next, we use the estimates in Table 4a to calculate the annual ‘green’ payments required for a risk 
neutral conventional farmer to switch to organic farming. Assuming an interest rate of 10 percent, a 
conventional corn soybean farmer would need to receive a one time payment of $315 per acre as a 
compensation for the conversion cost and an additional $1088 per acre to cover the long run higher 
production and market risk of the organic practices. The sum of these two values equals an annual 
payment of $370 per acre for a 5 year contract and $228 per acre for a 10 year contract.  
The CSP limit of $45,000 for total annual payments implies a farm could receive payments of 
$228 per acre per year for up to 197 acres. However, to qualify for Tier III payments, farmers need to 
address all resources of concern on their entire operation and this could be a limitation given the size 
of conventional corn soybean farms. From the 2002 Census of Agriculture, it follows that on the 
average soybean farm 228 acres of soybeans were harvested. In addition, the average corn farm 
harvested  196  acres  of corn. Most  farms  will  grow  both  crops.  In  this  context the  CSP  limit  of   11 
$45,000 for total annual payments seems more binding than the base payment restriction. The CSP 
base payment restriction of $13,000 per year would limit the farm size for enrollment in Tier III to 
1,155 acre, assuming a rental rate of $75 per acre for dryland corn and soybeans.  
 
 
5.   Discussion and Conclusions  
 
Based  on  option  value  theory,  we  have  developed  a  theoretical  model  to  assess  the  dollar 
compensation  required  for  widespread  conversion  from  conventional  to  organic  farming.  The 
empirical assessment for corn and soybean production provided strong evidence for the existence of 
an option value in addition to the cost of the transition. Our estimates for the option value decreased 
significantly  between  1997  and  2001.  One  explanation  for  this  phenomenon  is  that  the  value  of 
postponing conversion decreased due to the introduction of crop insurance in 2001. However, the 
number of corn and soybean acres that were insured in 2001 (6,400) is small compared to the increase 
in U.S. certified organic corn and soybean acreage between 1997 and 2001 (104,500).  Thus, perhaps 
a more plausible explanation for the drop in our option value estimates is that the increased supply of 
organic corn and soybeans led to lower price premiums.          
The results are discussed in the context of the recently introduced Conservation Security Program, 
which will provide farmers in the U.S. with direct payments for organic practices. Assuming an 
interest rate of 10%, a conventional corn soybean grower would need to receive a one time payment 
of $315 per acre to compensate for the conversion cost and an additional $1,088 per acre to cover the 
long run higher production and market risks. The sum of these two values equals an annual payment 
of $228 per acre for a 10 year contact.  
The  annual  payment  required  to  induce  the  marginal  farmer  to  switch  to  organic  could  be 
considerably  lower  if  the  Conservation  Security  Program  were  to  continue  beyond  the  initial 
enrollment period.  For example, if farmers expected the program to last for two enrollment cycles, or 
20  years, the threshold  annual  payment  would  drop to $165. However, to pursue this logic in a 
theoretically consistent way would require addressing the additional uncertainty associated with the 
possibility that the program will be terminated or fundamentally changed at some unknown point in 
the future. We leave this task for future research.   
Even  with  a  single  enrollment  cycle,  the  Conservation  Security  Program  should  increase  the 
number of organically farmed acres in the U.S. by increasing the relative profitability of organic 
farming and by reducing income risk for certified and in transition organic farmers. Because organic 
farms are more likely to qualify for CSP payments than conventional farms, the program should 
increase  the  relative  expected  profitability  and  reduce  the  income  variability  of  organic  farming. 
Furthermore, because enrollment does not require organic certification, farms in the transition process 
may also be eligible for CSP payments before they get certified. This should lessen the discomfort of 
the 3 year transition period when growers experience conversion costs but are not yet eligible for 
organic price premiums. Of course, an expansion of organic acreage due to the program would be 




Research for this paper was supported by a 2000 2004 USDA IFAFS Grant (“Revitalizing Small 
and Mid Sized Farms: Organic Research, Education and Extension’). The cooperation of the Organic 
Farming Research Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.   
 
References 
Delate, K., Duffy, M., Chase, C. Holste, A., Friedrich, H. and Wantate, N. (2003). An economic 
comparison of organic and conventional grain crops in a long term agro ecological research site 
in Iowa. American Journal of Alternative Agriculture 18: 59 69. 
Delate, K. and Cambardella, C.A. (2004). Agroecosystem performance during transition to certified 
organic grain production. Agronomy Journal 96(5): 1288 1298.   12 
Dixit,  A.K.  and  Pindyck,  R.S.  (1994).  Investment  under  uncertainty.  Princeton,  N.J.:  Princeton 
University Press.  
Fairweather,  J.R.  and  Campbell,  H.  (1996).  The  decision  making  of  organic  and  conventional 
agricultural producers. AERU Research Report no. 233, Lincoln University, New Zealand.   
Gardner,  B.  (2001).  Risk  created  by  Policy  in  Agriculture.  In:  R.E.  Just,  and  R.D.  Pope  eds.  
Comprehensive Assessment of the Role of Risk in U.S. Agriculture. Boston: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, pp. 489 510.  
Greene,  C.  and  Kremen,  A.  (2003).  U.S.  Organic  Farming  Emerges  in  2000 2001:  Adoption  of 
Certified  Systems.  Economic  Research  Service,  U.S.  Department  of  Agriculture, 
www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aib780/   
Hopkins, J. and Morehart, M. (2000). An Empirical Analysis of the Farm Problem: Comparability in 
Rates  of  Return,  Selected  paper  for:  Challenging  the  Agricultural  Economics  Paradigm, 
Symposium honoring the career of Luther G. Tweeten, Sept 10 11, 2000, Columbus, Ohio.  
Klonksy, K. and Smith, M.D. (2002) Entry and Exit in California’s Organic Farming Sector, In: Hall, 
D.C. and Moffitt, L.J. (eds) Economics of Pesticides, Sustainable Food Production, and Organic 
Food Markets, Amsterdam etc.: JAI (Elsevier Science).   
Kurkalova, L.A., Kling, C.L. and Zhao, J. (2003). Green Subsidies in Agriculture: Estimating the 
Adoption Cost of Conservation Tillage from Observed Behavior. Working Paper 01 WP 286, 
CARD, Iowa State University.   
Lohr, L. (2001). The Importance of the Conservation Security Act to US Competitiveness in Global 
Organic Markets. Faculty Series 01 19. Dept. of Agricultural and Applied Economics, University 
of Georgia, Athens GA.  
Lohr,  L.  and  Salomonson,  L.  (2000).  Conversion  subsidies  for  organic  production:  results  from 
Sweden and lessons for the United States. Agricultural Economics 22: 133 146. 
MacDonald,  R.  and  Siegel,  D.  (1986).  The  Value  of  Waiting  to  Invest,  Quarterly  Journal  of 
Economics 101: 707 728. 
MacInnis, B. (2004). Transaction Costs and Organic Marketing: Evidence from U.S. Organic Produce 
Farmers. Paper Presented at the 2004 AAEA annual meeting, Denver CO. 
Merton, R.C. (1990). Continuous Time Finance. Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell. 
Odening,  M.,  Musshoff,  O.  and  Balmann,  A.  (2005).  Investment  decisions  in  hog  finishing:  an 
application of the real options approach. Agricultural Economics 32: 47 60.  
Padel,  S.  (2001)  Conversion  to  Organic  Farming:  A  Typical  Example  of  the  Diffusion  of  an 
Innovation? Sociologia Ruralis 41: 40 61. 
Padel, S. and Lampkin, N.H. (1994). Farm level Performance of Organic farming Systems. In:  N.H. 
Lampkin and Padel, S. (eds), The Economics of Organic farming: An International Perspective. 
Wallingford U.K.: CAB International, 201 218.  
Pfann, G.A. (2001). Options to quit. Economics Letters 70: 259 265. 
Pietola, K.S. and Oude Lansink, A. (2001). Farmer response to policies promoting organic farming 
technologies in Finland, European Review of Agricultural Economics 28: 1 15. 
Spiller,  P.T.  and  Huang,  C.J.  (1986).  On  the  Extent  of  the  Market:  Wholesale  Gasoline  in  the 
Northeastern United States. Journal of Industrial Economics 35(1986): 131 145. 
United  States  Department  of  Agriculture  (2004a).  Natural  Resources  Conservation  Service, 
Conservation  Security  Program:  Self Assessment  Workbook.  PA 1770.  June  2004. 
http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/programs/csp/  
United States Department of Agriculture (2004b). Natural Resources Conservation Service, Farm Bill 
2002,  Conservation  Security  Program  Comprehensive  Questions  and  Answers.  July  2004. 
http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/programs/csp/  
United  States  Department  of  Agriculture  (2004c).  Natural  Resources  Conservation  Service,  CSP 
Fiscal Year 2004 Contract Payments Approved by Watershed. Online Data. August 2004.  
Wossink, Ada and Koos Gardebroek (2005). Environmental Policy Uncertainty and Marketable Permit 
Systems: The Dutch Phosphate Quota Program. Accepted for American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics (see http://www.ag econ.ncsu.edu/faculty/wossink/wossinkpubs.htm). 